The least cohesive South American side became the only one not to advance despite a weak group. The Ecuadorian players acquitted themselves well in their final match against a deep French team, playing with admirable desperation that only increased when they went a man down, but their coach continued to be idea-less.
THE WORLD CUP'S WORST-COACHED SIDE
Reinaldo Rueda, who probably kept his job during qualifiers because of his team's home record at altitude and his cozy ties with Ecuador's sporting director, never carved out a valid, modern identity for this side.
Except for a few unconvincing moments of experimentation, Rueda has lined up his side in a rudderless, reactive 4-4-2.
Never a team to even attempt to keep possession, Ecuador rarely got numbers forward on the counter either. The three-on-two break against France was an unaccustomed sight, with a bandaged, holding midfielder Noboa providing the numerical advantage, but also fluffing the shot.
Ecuador's only identifiable strategy in qualification had been a surreal, severely out-dated type of wing-slinging hero-ball.
Their strongest players Jefferson Montero and Antonio Valencia--often facing double teams--basically crossed the ball from one wing to another, where each attempted mazy dribbles through increasingly compact defenses.
With all three World Cup opponents simply earmarking a midfielder and a defender to double down on those two, Ecuador has, incredibly, not had a plan B.
Both Valencia and Montero have had frustrating tournaments, and their coach has done little to prevent this. In a sense they've been put in a position to be blamed for Ecuador's exit, with their coach not having bothered to imagine how they could find space despite the inevitable double and triple teams they've so predictably faced.
The only reason Ecuador was even close to escaping the group stages was the sudden emergence of Enner Valencia, who after being underused at Ecuador's Emelec for seasons, had a breakout year scoring eighteen goals for Mexico's Pachuca, followed by a remarkable World Cup where he tied the country's record for goals scored.
Against France, their atrocious 63% pass completion rate points to dozens of unnecessary 50-50 balls, and points back to their perpetual surrender of the center of the pitch, even while both central midfielders (Noboa and Minda) ran more than 11 kilometers each in the contest.
While Ecuador ended up conceding on average a goal a game, their defensive set-up was problematic from the get-go, and, similar to the team's offense, relied on heroics instead of strategy.
Michael Cox, ESPN's best tactical commentator and the creator of Zonal Marking, assesses Ecuador's defense:
"Ecuador appear, in a purely tactical sense, the most basic side at this competition. Reinaldo Rueda...seems set to embark upon a bold and potentially naive strategy of using a (not particularly compact) 4-4-2 formation, leaving his central midfielders exposed against superior technical opponents, and leaving his limited centre-backs prone to the pace of onrushing attackers."
So not only does Ecuador not get numbers forward on the break or prevent their all-important wingers from being neutralized, they also allow themselves to be overrun in the center of the midfield and defense.
It's always seemed like folly to concede the middle of the pitch, and while some will point to Ecuador's uneven talent, a lot more has been done with a lot less.
A RIBERY-LESS FRANCE COULD STILL COMPETE
France have been able to get a majority of their players battle-tested before the knockout round, something that could serve them well as they attempt to progress deeper into the tournament with various players hobbled by knocks.
Missing their best player, France's other budding stars have emerged and their fluid, balanced attack mixed with a healthy dose of physical grit make them a dark horse to compete for the cup.
THE WORLD CUP'S WORST-COACHED SIDE
Reinaldo Rueda, who probably kept his job during qualifiers because of his team's home record at altitude and his cozy ties with Ecuador's sporting director, never carved out a valid, modern identity for this side.
Except for a few unconvincing moments of experimentation, Rueda has lined up his side in a rudderless, reactive 4-4-2.
Never a team to even attempt to keep possession, Ecuador rarely got numbers forward on the counter either. The three-on-two break against France was an unaccustomed sight, with a bandaged, holding midfielder Noboa providing the numerical advantage, but also fluffing the shot.
Ecuador's only identifiable strategy in qualification had been a surreal, severely out-dated type of wing-slinging hero-ball.
Their strongest players Jefferson Montero and Antonio Valencia--often facing double teams--basically crossed the ball from one wing to another, where each attempted mazy dribbles through increasingly compact defenses.
With all three World Cup opponents simply earmarking a midfielder and a defender to double down on those two, Ecuador has, incredibly, not had a plan B.
Both Valencia and Montero have had frustrating tournaments, and their coach has done little to prevent this. In a sense they've been put in a position to be blamed for Ecuador's exit, with their coach not having bothered to imagine how they could find space despite the inevitable double and triple teams they've so predictably faced.
The only reason Ecuador was even close to escaping the group stages was the sudden emergence of Enner Valencia, who after being underused at Ecuador's Emelec for seasons, had a breakout year scoring eighteen goals for Mexico's Pachuca, followed by a remarkable World Cup where he tied the country's record for goals scored.
Against France, their atrocious 63% pass completion rate points to dozens of unnecessary 50-50 balls, and points back to their perpetual surrender of the center of the pitch, even while both central midfielders (Noboa and Minda) ran more than 11 kilometers each in the contest.
While Ecuador ended up conceding on average a goal a game, their defensive set-up was problematic from the get-go, and, similar to the team's offense, relied on heroics instead of strategy.
Michael Cox, ESPN's best tactical commentator and the creator of Zonal Marking, assesses Ecuador's defense:
"Ecuador appear, in a purely tactical sense, the most basic side at this competition. Reinaldo Rueda...seems set to embark upon a bold and potentially naive strategy of using a (not particularly compact) 4-4-2 formation, leaving his central midfielders exposed against superior technical opponents, and leaving his limited centre-backs prone to the pace of onrushing attackers."
So not only does Ecuador not get numbers forward on the break or prevent their all-important wingers from being neutralized, they also allow themselves to be overrun in the center of the midfield and defense.
It's always seemed like folly to concede the middle of the pitch, and while some will point to Ecuador's uneven talent, a lot more has been done with a lot less.
A RIBERY-LESS FRANCE COULD STILL COMPETE
France have been able to get a majority of their players battle-tested before the knockout round, something that could serve them well as they attempt to progress deeper into the tournament with various players hobbled by knocks.
Missing their best player, France's other budding stars have emerged and their fluid, balanced attack mixed with a healthy dose of physical grit make them a dark horse to compete for the cup.